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CARDINAL NEWMAN 
ON THE INDEFECTIBILITY 
OF CERTITUDE 
Jay NEWMAN 
There are man y passages in Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent which 
provide fresh insights into subjects widely discussed by contemporary 
epistemologists, and sorne of the most interesting of these are to be found in the 
section of the treatise which deals \Vith the "Indefectibility of Certitude" (Chapter 
7, § 2), In the following pages we shaH consider Newman's attack on epistemolo-
gical scepticism and his analysis of certitude, We are going to see that there is a 
fundamental inconsistency in Newman '5 theory of certitude, but we shall also find 
that Newman has raised sorne disturhing epistemological problems, 
Newman's philosophy falls very much within the British Empiricist tradition, 
Newman took his early philosophical training at Oxford, was a keen student of 
Locke's Essay, and was familiar with the idealistic and sceptical arguments of 
Berkeley and Hume, His discussion of the indefectibility of certitude begins with 
an attack on a kind of scepticism with which ail contemporary epistemologists are 
familial', He writes, 
What looks like certitude always is exposed to the chance of tuming out to be 
a mistake, If our intimate, deliberate conviction may be counterfeit in the 
case of one proposition, why not in the case of another') If in the case of one 
man, why not in the case of a hundred? ls certitude then ever possible 
without the attendant gift of infallihility? 
And in the next paragraph, he asks, 
And, as to the feeling of finality and security, ought it ever to be indulged? Is 
it not a mere weakness or extravagance; a deceit, to be eschewed by every 
clear and prudent mind? With the countless instances, on ail sides of us, of 
human fallibility, with the constant exhibitions of antagonist certitudes, who 
can so sin against modesty and sobriety of mind, as not to be content with 
probahility, as the truc guide of life, renouncing ambitious thoughts, which 
are sure either to delude him, or to disappoint? 
Newman begins his answer by distinguishing between i nfallibi lit y and certitude, 
He argues that many people have been led to scepticism because of their failure to 
understand this distinction, "A certitude," Newman writes, .. is directed to this 
or that particular proposition; it is not a faculty or gift, but a disposition of mind 
relatively to a definite case which is before me", Infallibility, on the other hand, 
"is a faculty or gift, and relates, not to sorne one truth in particular, but to all 
possible propositions in a given subject-matter". Only people, and not beliefs or 
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opinions, are fallible or infallible. A person can be fallible and still be certain of 
specifie propositions: 
Certitude is at most nothing more th an infallibility pro Iwe vice, and promises 
nothing as to the truth of any proposition besides its own. That 1 am certain 
of this proposition to-day, is no ground for thinking that 1 shall have a right to 
be certain of that proposition to-morrow: and that 1 am wrong in my convic-
tions about to-day's proposition, does not hinder my having a true convic-
tion, a genuine certitude, about to-morrow's proposition. If indeed 1 claimed 
to be infallible, one failure wou Id shiver my daim to pieces; but 1 may daim 
to be certain of the truth to which 1 have already attained, though 1 should 
arrive at no new truths in addition as long as 1 live. 
After making this important distinction between a faculty and a propositional 
attitude, Newman admits that he has not as yet disposed of the problem of epis-
temological scepticism. Certitude, he observes, involves a sense of security and of 
repose, and it is still not clear how this security can be ours. We have ail been 
"balked by false certitudes a hundred times," and so how is future certitude 
possible "when it thus manifestly ministers to error and to scepticism?" ln ans-
wering this new question, Newman does not deny that the false certitudes of the 
past "are to the prejudice of subsequent ones." He admits that they constitute an 
"antecedent difficuIty" in our allowing ourselves to be certain of something today 
or tomorrow. "[B]ut antecedent objections to an act are not sufficient of them-
selves to prohibit its exercise; the y may demand of us an increased circumspec-
tion before committing ourselves to it, but may be met with reasons more than 
sufficient to overcome them." Newman is making an empirical daim here. and a 
true one. At the time when Newman was writing these lines, Peirce's study of 
"Sorne Consequences of Four Incapacities" had just appeared in an 1868 edition 
of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. There, criticizing the scepticism of 
Descartes' first Meditation, Peirce warns, "Let us not pretend to doubt in 
philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." This theme is one of Newman's 
favorites, and can be traced back to his earliest philosophical writings. Still, that 
we are and can be certain does not entail that we have a right to be. Newman 
dearly believes that the reasons that overcome the antecedent objections are 
sound ones, reasons that ought to overcome them. Now, certitude is an assent 
"given expressly after reasoning," and if my certitude is unfounded, "it is the 
reasoning that is in fauIt, not my assent to it." Moreover, 
ft is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusions to which ratiocination has 
brought me, by that formai assent which 1 have called a certitude. 1 could 
indeed have withheld my assent, but 1 should have acted against my nature, 
had 1 done so when there was what 1 considered a proof; and 1 did only what 
was fitting, what was incumbent on me, upon those existing conditions. in 
giving it. 
So much for Newman's attack on a basic kind of epistemological scepticism. Now 
let us contrast it with his analysis of certitude. In summarizing his views on the 
nature of certitude in the last paragraph of Chapter 7, Newman writes, 
It seems then that on the whole there are three conditions of certitude: that it 
follows on investigation and proof, that it is accompanied by a specific sense 
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of intellectual satisfaction and repose, and that it is irreversible. If the asse nt 
is made without rational grounds, it is a rash judgment, a fancy, or a pre-
judice: if without the sense of finality, it is scarcely more than an inference; if 
without permanence, it is a mere conviction. 
Certitude is probably not the only indefectible assent: "prejudice may be such," 
but the two assents cannot be confused, for the latter is an assent "previous to 
rational grounds." Indefectibility is at least a "negative test of certitude, or sine 
qI/ci /10/1 condition, so that whoever loses his conviction on a given point is 
thereby proved not to have been certain of it." Some contemporary epis-
temologists (e.g., certain Austinians) would criticize Newman on this point, but 
Newman is certainly trying hard to give an account of expressions like "1 am 
certain that ... " which is faithful to ordinary-Ianguage usage. In fact, throughout 
the Grammar, Newman is constantly appealing to ordinary language as a sounder 
criterion than the technical terminology of philosophers and intellectuals, whom 
Newman does not trust as mu ch as the average man. 
ln pointing to rationality, the sense offinality, and permanence, Newman has 
set down three very demanding conditions of certitude. He has shown that he is 
willing to dismiss much that appears to be certitude as "false certitude," a coun-
terfeit article which is quite different from the genuine one. But he has also 
attacked epistemological scepticism and argued that certitude has a "definite and 
fixed place among our mental acts." But now he begins to run into trouble. How 
do we know when we are certain? At subsection 6 of Chapter 7, § 2, Newman 
writes, 
Certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discrimi-
nate it from false certitude. Su ch a test is rendered impossible from the 
circumstance that, when we make the mental act expressed by "1 know," we 
sum up the who le series of reflex judgments which might, each in turn, 
successively exercise a critical function towards those of the series which 
precede it. 
A few pages earlier, at subsection 4, he has written, 
[C]ertitude follows upon examination and pro of, as the bell sounds the hour, 
when the hands reach it,-so that no act or state of the intellect is certitude, 
however it may resemble it, which does not observe this appointed law. This 
proviso greatly diminishes the catalogue of genuine certitudes. 
At subsection 3, he has described the sense of certitude as "the bell of the 
inte\1ect," and warned, "that it strikes when it should not is a proofthat the clock 
is out of order, no proof that the bell will be untrustworthy and useless, when it 
comes to us adjusted and regulated from the hands of the clock-maker." Is New-
man being consistent here? 
That he is not becomes quite clear when we consider his talk about the 
"illative sense" in Chapter 9 ... It is the mind that reasons, not any technical 
apparatus of words and propositions," and we may cali its power of "judging and 
concluding" the "Illative Sense" (§ 2). At the end of Chapter 8, Newman writes 
that, "Judgment then in ail concrete matter is the architectonie facuIty: and what 
may be called the Illative Sense, or right judgment in ratiocination, is one branch 
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of it." Now, in Chapter 9, he ash if there is any criteriol/ of the accuracy of an 
inference, "such as may be our warrant that certitude is rightly elicited in favour 
of the proposition inferred." He answers that there is-" the sole and final judg-
ment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the per-
sonal action of the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which 1 have 
called the IIIative Sense .... " The illative sense plays an important raIe in 
Newman's project. Newman is a Christian apologist, and his aim in the Grammar 
is to show that a simple, unlearned man can, without any knowledge of complex 
philosophical arguments, be-and have a right to be-certain of the truth of religi-
ous propositions. At Chapter 8, § 2, which bridges his discussions of the indefecti-
bility of certitude and the role of the illative sense, he suggests that formaI infer-
ence does not enable us to become certain of what is concrete. Certitude in 
conCl'ete matter depends on our recognition of the "cumulation" and "converg-
ing" of subtle "probabilities." So if the average man does not possess something 
like the illative sense, and cannat detect when "probabilities" have "converged" 
to justify certitude, then, being wholly ignorant of the scientific demonstrations of 
Aquinas and others, he cannot and should not feel certain that God exists, that the 
Church' s teachings are true, etc. Whenever an empiricist philosopher has trouble 
explaining something that has to be explained and cannot be explained in any other 
way, he either turns ta scepticism or caBs upon a special sense or faculty. Newman, 
eschewing scepticism, gives us an iIlative sense, one which can be understood when 
it is compared to paraliel faculties like phronesis. 
Now we are in the position to see the fundamental inconsistency in 
Newman' s theory of certitude. Newman has introduced a specialfaculty in order 
to show how certitude in concrete matter is possible and warrantable (i.e., recog-
nizable as "rightly elicited"). Newman has c\early committed himselfto the posi-
tion that the warrantability of certitude depends on the reliability of the illative 
sense, which is the" sole and final" judge of inferences in concrete matter. But 
(the sense of) celtitude would not even be possible-in concrete matter, at least 
-if we lacked a faculty which enables us to recognize the convergence of prob-
abilities. So the illative sense saves us from scep1icism, from uncertainty. Or does 
it? ln lIttacking scepticism, Newman has argued 1hat the reliability of our judg-
ment is only one of several factors that we consider prior to allowing ourse Ives to 
be certain of a particular proposition. The "antecedent difficulty" of false cer-
titudes of the past being "to the prejudice of subsequent ones" can be overcome 
by sound reasons which are in sorne sense independent of the ülculty of judgment. 
But can reasons-even very good ones-justify or ground certitude wh en the 
"sole and final" judge is defective, unreliable, untrustworthy? Newman wants ta 
have his cake and eat il. He says that certitude is possible and warrantable be-
cause we possess a special faculty, the illative sense. But he also says that cer-
titude is possible and warrantable because our confidence in our faculty ofjudg-
ment is not a necessary condition of il. 
Now consider Newman's clock analogy. Newman admits 1hat the sense of 
certitude, the bel! of the intellect, often strikes when il should no1. Still, according 
to Newman, that does not me an that the "clock" (the faculty ofjudgment) will be 
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untrustworthy and useless when it cornes back to us "adjusted and regulated from 
the hands of the clock-maker." This analogy is far from satisfactory. For one 
thing, Newman's original c1aim was, "that 1 am wrong in my convictions about 
to-day's proposition, does not hinder my having a true conviction, a genuine 
certitude, about to-morrow' s proposition." But in the case of a clock. when we 
know that it has mi sIed liS once, we will not trust it again III/fil if II(JS heel/ 
repaired. So, if the analogy is to hold, if 1 am wrong in my convictions ahout 
today' s proposition, 1 should not trust my illative sense until it has been "adjusted 
and regulated." But to whom does one go to have his illative sense adjusted and 
regulated? We can agree with Newman that the faculty ofjudgment does "rcquirc 
and admit of discipline." But how is it disciplined and adjusted and regulated ') If 
inference in concrete matter is really as personal and informai as Newman thinh 
it is, then studying logic is not going to help us to adjust our illative senses. 
Besides, if the simple, unlearned man has to go to someone to have his faculty of 
judgment adjusted, then has not Newman's whole apologetical project been un-
dermined'! For his main aim was to show how the simple. unlearned man cano 
without much difficulty, come to be certain of the truth of religious propositions. 
Newman could, perhaps. as he is often inclined to do, give a sort of Augustinian 
reply to this challenge, and argue that faith brings with it the appropriatc adju'it-
ment of our faculty of judgment. But Newman himself admits that the logical 
order is reason first and faith second, and in any case, not man y contemporary 
epistemologists are impressed by this particular kind of Augustinian move. New-
man cou Id also argue for the relevance here of his famous (and unsatisfactory) 
distinction between "inferences" and "assents." but even ifthis distinction were 
a satisfactory one, the fact is that in § 2 of Chapter 7, Newman himself has blurred 
the distinction. 
It is clear that Cardinal Newman's approach to certitude is inconsistent and 
thus unsatisfactory; but we are stillieft with the epistemological problems that he 
has raised in his discussion. As an apologist, Newman recognizes the need for 
certitude: 
Without certitude in religious faith there may be much decency of profession 
and of observance, but there can be not habit of prayer, no directness of 
devotion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of self-sacrifice. 
Certitude then is essential to the Christian .... (Chapter 7. § 1.) 
As far as Newman is concerned, this fact alone forces us to reject epistemological 
scepticism. Epistemological scepticism breeds theological scepticism. Newman is 
no ordinary epistemologist, but a committed Christian. He even goes so far as to 
say that the fact of certitude is a proof that it is not a weakness to be certain-
"How it cornes about that we can be certain is not my business to determine: for 
me it is sufficient that certitude is leff' (Chapter 9, Introduction). Still, Newman 
knows that he is not much of an apologist if he does not confront the problems that 
he has raised. And so he tries to show certitude is possible even though wc arc ail 
weil aware that we have felt certain of sorne things which have turned out to be 
l'aise. One answer that he gives is that much that passes for (the sense of) certitude 
is not the real thing. But we ha ve been interested in his two other answers, the t wo 
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which conflict. The first is, in effect, that certitude is based on reasons; the past 
unreliability of our faculty of judgment is a consideration to be taken into account, 
but only one of many, and it can be outweighed or "overcome" by others. This 
answer does dispose of the problem of epistemological scepticism. But even 
Newman is unhappy with it, for we are dearly left with a basic question-"How 
do we know that reasons x ,y, and z overcome the 'antecedent difficuIty' of the 
past unreliability of our faculty of judgment'?" That faculty is being called upon to 
evaluate conditions upon which it is itself overruled! So Newman is forced to 
concede that we cannot throw out the "dock"; we have to have it adjusted. But 
we are not dear as to how the dock can be adjusted; and by admitting that the 
dock has to be adjusted, we are admitting that the problem of epistemological 
scepticism still stands. Yet, recognizing that our faculty of judgment has misled us 
itself involves a judgment, a judgment on the faculty. There cannot be an infinite 
regression of su ch faculties of judgment ; perhaps the "illative sense" is self-
critical, and in that sense, truly the "sole and final" judge. If so, Newman's final 
answer is the most attractive. But have we really disposed of the problem of 
epistemological scepticism wh en we have followed Newman in acknowledging the 
existence of a judge or sense which is so reliable that it even recognizes its own 
unreliability'? 
20 
